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Introduction to "The Political Economy of American Trade Policy"

In: The Political Economy of American Trade Policy

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  • Anne O. Krueger

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  • Anne O. Krueger, 1996. "Introduction to "The Political Economy of American Trade Policy"," NBER Chapters, in: The Political Economy of American Trade Policy, pages 1-10, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:8702
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert C. Feenstra & Tracy R. Lewis, 1991. "Distributing The Gains From Trade With Incomplete Information," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 21-39, March.
    2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    3. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-985, December.
    4. Dani Rodrik, 1994. "What Does the Political Economy Literature on Trade Policy (Not) Tell UsThat We Ought To Know?," NBER Working Papers 4870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
    6. Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1982. "Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 223-244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Qiao Xiaoyong, 2013. "The Empirical Research on Macro Decision-Making Factors of Implementing Countervailing Policy," Journal of Systems Science and Information, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 60-73, February.

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