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The Quality of Life in Prisons: Do Educational Programs Reduce In-Prison Conflicts?

In: The Economics of Crime: Lessons For and From Latin America

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  • María Laura Alzúa
  • Catherine Rodriguez
  • Edgar Villa

Abstract

The harshness of punishment society chooses to impose on crime offenders is mandated by law. However, the quality of life in prison can make this punishment harsher. This creates a variation in the severity of punishment which is not legislated and may differ from society's taste for penalties. Indicators of in prison violence and conflicts seem to be appropriate proxy variables for prison conditions. Using indicators of in prison violent behavior, we use an exogenous source in education participation in educational programs in order to asses the effect of education on such measures of conflict. Applying instrumental variables techniques to census data for Argentine prisons, we find that educational programs significantly reduce indicators of property damages in prison. Such reductions amounts to a 60 percent decrease relative to the mean level of property damages.
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Suggested Citation

  • María Laura Alzúa & Catherine Rodriguez & Edgar Villa, 2010. "The Quality of Life in Prisons: Do Educational Programs Reduce In-Prison Conflicts?," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Crime: Lessons For and From Latin America, pages 239-264, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:11843
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    1. John H. Tyler & Jeffrey R. Kling, 2004. "Prison-Based Education And Re-Entry Into The Mainstream Labor Market," Working Papers 2004-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    2. John H. Tyler & Jeffrey R. Kling, 2004. "Prison-Based Education And Re-Entry Into The Mainstream Labor Market," Working Papers 2004-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    3. Di Tella, Rafael & Dubra, Juan, 2008. "Crime and punishment in the "American Dream"," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1564-1584, July.
    4. Lawrence Katz & Steven D. Levitt & Ellen Shustorovich, 2003. "Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 5(2), pages 318-343, August.
    5. M. Grubb, 2003. "Editorial," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 189-190, September.
    6. Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson & David Pozen, 2009. "Building Criminal Capital behind Bars: Peer Effects in Juvenile Corrections," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 105-147.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2013. "Criminal Recidivism after Prison and Electronic Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(1), pages 28-73.
    2. Oscar Barriga, 2012. "Conductas violentas y hacinamiento carcelario," Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad, Universidad de los Andes,Facultad de Economía, CEDE, June.

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