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Products Liability

In: Tort Law and Economics

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  • Mark A. Geistfeld

Abstract

This volume provides a state-of-the-art overview of the literature on the economic analysis of tort law. In sixteen chapters, the specialist authors guide the reader through the often vast literature in each domain providing a balanced and comprehensive summary. Particular attention is paid to the evolution of the field, further refinements to economic models and relevant conclusions and lessons for the policymaker.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark A. Geistfeld, 2009. "Products Liability," Chapters, in: Michael Faure (ed.), Tort Law and Economics, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:12978_11
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    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/nlm-book/9781782547457/b1_chapter11.xml
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the joint use of liability and safety regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 371-382, September.
    3. Rubin, Paul H & Bailey, Martin J, 1994. "The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 807-831, June.
    4. Abraham, Kenneth S, 1990. "Products Liability Law and Insurance Profitability," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 837-844, June.
    5. Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1979. "Consumer Information, Equilibrium Industry Price, and the Number of Sellers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(2), pages 483-502, Autumn.
    6. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    7. Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, 2007. "Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(2), pages 221-238.
    8. Edward E. Schlee, 1996. "The Value of Information About Product Quality," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 803-815, Winter.
    9. Franklin Allen, 1984. "Reputation and Product Quality," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 311-327, Autumn.
    10. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the joint use of liability and safety regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 371-382, September.
    11. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1991. "Regulation and the Law of Torts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 54-58, May.
    12. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    Cited by:

    1. Baumann, Florian, 2015. "Freier Warenverkehr und unverfälschter Wettbewerb in der Europäischen Union: Der Beitrag der europäischen Produkthaftung," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 75, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    2. Gérard Mondello & Evens Salies, 2016. "Tort law under oligopolistic competition," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03459225, HAL.
    3. Tim Friehe & Christoph Rößler & Xiaoge Dong, 2020. "Liability for Third-Party Harm When Harm-Inflicting Consumers Are Present Biased," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 22(1), pages 75-104.

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