IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/eee/artchp/1-17.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Organization of Arts and Entertainment Industries

In: Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture

Author

Listed:
  • Caves, Richard E.

Abstract

The organization of the creative (arts and entertainment) industries rests on many types of contracts. These contracts govern collaborations between artists and other parties - at arm's length, or within an enterprise. These contracts' structures devolve from a few bedrock properties of creative work and creative products. Artists invest in developing their talents, presenting themselves before `gatekeepers' who seek talents that can profitably be developed and marketed. Gatekeepers commonly function as agents for selecting artists and as match-makers between artists and complementary inputs. As an extension of the gatekeeping function, the participants in creative industries take part in a continuous ranking process that sets and revises the ranks of vertically differentiated talents. Real option contracts pervasively govern the sequential steps of developing a creative product. These can leave the artist an autonomous creative agent (pop musicians and record labels) or enclose artists' talents in an employment relationship (classic Hollywood studios). The transformation of the movie industry to `flexible specialization' illustrates how changing basic conditions can transform the dominant form of organization. The scales of enterprise in the creative industries tend to be driven by the efficient scales with which creative goods are distributed (very large for record labels and movie studios, small for art galleries), and they tend to assort themselves into those focused on the distribution of creative goods (`promoters') and those concerned with identifying and nurturing creative talents (`pickers'). Large enterprises also include the `entertainment conglomerates' which seek synergistic gains that depend theoretically on quite special conditions; foreclosure and its avoidance may be principal motives. Non-profit enterprises dominate a number of arts activities, apparently for two interrelated reasons. These activities incur high fixed but low marginal costs, pressing them to employ two-part prices and club arrangements to ensure fixed costs' coverage. When product quality is endogenous, however, non-profit status may be necessary for the manager credibly to foreswear degrading quality once the fixed payment is in hand. Non-profits supported by donation streams thus enjoy functional advantages.

Suggested Citation

  • Caves, Richard E., 2006. "Organization of Arts and Entertainment Industries," Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, in: V.A. Ginsburgh & D. Throsby (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 533-566, Elsevier.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:artchp:1-17
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B7P5G-4KV3VPW-P/2/35d44b0e9267c4f94c9bb5a65f26e179
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ennio E. Piano, 2022. "Specialization and the firm in Renaissance Italian art," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 46(4), pages 659-697, December.
    2. Chun‐Yu Ho & Yue Sheng, 2022. "Productivity advantage of large cities for creative industries," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(6), pages 1289-1306, December.
    3. Homero Rodríguez-Insuasti & Néstor Montalván-Burbano & Otto Suárez-Rodríguez & Marcela Yonfá-Medranda & Katherine Parrales-Guerrero, 2022. "Creative Economy: A Worldwide Research in Business, Management and Accounting," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(23), pages 1-27, November.
    4. Barnett Jonathan M., 2014. "Copyright without Creators," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 389-438, January.
    5. Jonathan M. Barnett & Gilles Grolleau & Sana El Harbi, 2010. "The Fashion Lottery: Cooperative Innovation in Stochastic Markets," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 159-200, January.
    6. Tao, Jin & Ho, Chun-Yu & Luo, Shougui & Sheng, Yue, 2019. "Agglomeration economies in creative industries," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 141-154.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Z19 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Other

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:artchp:1-17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookseriesdescription.cws_home/BS_HE/description .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.