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Shuguang Zhu

Personal Details

First Name:Shuguang
Middle Name:
Last Name:Zhu
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pzh741
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/shuguangzhu1989/

Affiliation

School of Economics
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Shanghai, China
http://se.shufe.edu.cn/
RePEc:edi:seshucn (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms," Post-Print hal-03863573, HAL.
  2. Daniil Larionov & Hien Pham & Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2022_377, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  3. Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "Type-contingent Information Disclosure," TSE Working Papers 21-1242, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

Articles

  1. Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  2. Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 494-514, November.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms," Post-Print hal-03863573, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2018. "Restricted Environments and Incentive Compatibility in Interdependent Values Models," Working Papers 1024, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Tilman Börgers & Jiangtao Li, 2019. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(6), pages 2003-2035, November.
    3. Wanchang Zhang, 2021. "Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism," Papers 2105.05427, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    4. Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro, 2021. "Auction Design with Heterogeneous Priors," TSE Working Papers 21-1260, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Mar 2023.
    5. Tilman Börgers, 2017. "(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(2), pages 73-82, June.
    6. Satoshi Nakada & Shmuel Nitzan & Takashi Ui, 2022. "Robust Voting under Uncertainty," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 038, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
    7. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Robust Private Supply of a Public Good," Papers 2201.00923, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.

  2. Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "Type-contingent Information Disclosure," TSE Working Papers 21-1242, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    2. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "Sorting and Grading," Papers 2208.10894, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.

Articles

  1. Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).

    Cited by:

    1. Pham, Hien, 2023. "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 120364, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Mar 2024.
    2. Pham, Hien, 2023. "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 120462, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Mar 2024.

  2. Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 494-514, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 6 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-DES: Economic Design (6) 2018-08-27 2021-09-06 2021-12-06 2023-01-09 2023-02-13 2023-02-20. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (5) 2018-08-27 2021-12-06 2023-01-09 2023-02-13 2023-02-20. Author is listed
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2023-01-09 2023-02-20. Author is listed
  4. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (1) 2021-09-06

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