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Between the Horns of a Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and Conflict Dynamics in South Asia

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  • Surinder Mohan

Abstract

The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan is a highly complex conflict that requires a comprehensive understanding. Employing the “levels of analysis” theoretical framework, this article delves into the intricacies of South Asian rivalry at three levels: intrastate, interstate, and regional. From the early years of partition, it is apparent that New Delhi's approach of rotating Kashmiri leadership to maintain political balance has instead led to continued instability in the state. On a bilateral level, India and Pakistan find themselves trapped in an endless cycle of acute anxiety, armed violence, and failed negotiations which has complicated and prolonged the sub‐continental rivalry. Finally, from the standpoint of the regional subsystem‐level explanation, this article emphasizes how China's expanding footprint in South Asia is exacerbating tensions in the sub‐continental system. Hence, it is imperative for India to focus on the conditions and causal processes at the level of domestic politics by engaging Kashmiris in a meaningful dialogue. India should also adapt its approach to power politics, both internally and externally, particularly by embracing soft power strategies, to expand its diplomatic currency and status in South Asia and beyond. 印度与巴基斯坦之间的克什米尔争端是一场高度复杂的冲突, 需要对其进行全面理解。本文采用“分析层次”概念, 从国内、国际和地区三个层次深入探讨南亚竞争的复杂性。从印巴分治初期开始, 新德里方面为维持政治平衡而采取的轮换克什米尔领导层的做法显然导致了该国的持续不稳定。在双边层面, 印度和巴基斯坦陷入了无休止的极度焦虑、武装暴力和谈判失败的循环, 这让地区竞争变得更加复杂和漫长。最后, 本文从区域子系统层面的角度, 强调了中国在南亚不断扩大的影响力如何加剧了地区系统的紧张局势。因此, 印度必须聚焦于国内政治的条件和因果过程, 即与克什米尔人进行有意义的对话;并调整其对内和对外的权力政治方法, 特别是通过采用软实力战略, 以扩大其在南亚及其他地区的外交影响力和地位。 La disputa de Cachemira entre India y Pakistán es un conflicto muy complejo que requiere una comprensión integral. Al emplear el concepto de “niveles de análisis”, este artículo profundiza en las complejidades de la rivalidad del sur de Asia en tres niveles: intraestatal, interestatal y regional. Desde los primeros años de la partición, es evidente que el enfoque de Nueva Delhi de rotar el liderazgo cachemir para mantener el equilibrio político ha llevado a una inestabilidad continua en el estado. A nivel bilateral, India y Pakistán se encuentran atrapados en un ciclo interminable de ansiedad aguda, violencia armada y negociaciones fallidas que ha complicado y prolongado la rivalidad subcontinental. Por último, desde el punto de vista de la explicación a nivel de subsistema regional, este artículo enfatiza cómo la creciente huella de China en el sur de Asia está exacerbando las tensiones en el sistema subcontinental. Por lo tanto, es imperativo que la India se center en las condiciones y los procesos causales a nivel de la política interna, involucrando a los habitantes de Cachemira en un diálogo significativo y adaptando su enfoque a la política de poder, tanto interna como externamente, particularmente adoptando estrategias de poder blando, para expandirse. su moneda diplomática y su estatus en el sur de Asia y más allá.

Suggested Citation

  • Surinder Mohan, 2025. "Between the Horns of a Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and Conflict Dynamics in South Asia," World Affairs, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 188(1), January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:woraff:v:188:y:2025:i:1:n:e12065
    DOI: 10.1002/waf2.12065
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