IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/jnlamp/v2016y2016i1n4180864.html

Strong Isomorphism in Eisert‐Wilkens‐Lewenstein Type Quantum Games

Author

Listed:
  • Piotr Frąckiewicz

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to bring together the notions of quantum game and game isomorphism. The work is intended as an attempt to introduce a new criterion for quantum game schemes. The generally accepted requirement forces a quantum scheme to generate the classical game in a particular case. Now, given a quantum game scheme and two isomorphic classical games, we additionally require the resulting quantum games to be isomorphic as well. We are concerned with the Eisert‐Wilkens‐Lewenstein quantum game scheme and the strong isomorphism between games in strategic form.

Suggested Citation

  • Piotr Frąckiewicz, 2016. "Strong Isomorphism in Eisert‐Wilkens‐Lewenstein Type Quantum Games," Advances in Mathematical Physics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 2016(1).
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jnlamp:v:2016:y:2016:i:1:n:4180864
    DOI: 10.1155/2016/4180864
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2016/4180864
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1155/2016/4180864?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sudholter, Peter & Rosenmuller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel, 2000. "The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 299-338, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Casajus, Andre, 2003. "Weak isomorphism of extensive games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 267-290, December.
    2. Cao, Zhigang & Yang, Xiaoguang, 2018. "Symmetric games revisited," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 9-18.
    3. Peleg, Bezalel, 1997. "A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 305-308, September.
    4. Sudholter, Peter & Rosenmuller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel, 2000. "The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 299-338, April.
    5. Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2016. "On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 83-107, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:jnlamp:v:2016:y:2016:i:1:n:4180864. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/3197 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.