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No Adjudication

Author

Listed:
  • Charlotte S. Alexander
  • Nathan Dahlberg
  • Alexandra D. Lahav
  • Peter Siegelman

Abstract

Using the complete record of all federal civil docket sheets for cases filed in a two‐year period, recently made available by the SCALES‐OKN project, we find that most cases that enter the federal system—about 60%–68%—are resolved without any dispositive motion filed for consideration by a neutral arbiter (judge or magistrate) or a trial. Only 30%–40% include a filing of a dispositive motion (such as a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment) or, in the rare case, trial. An additional 8% exit the system, mostly by remand or transfer. The majority of cases resolved at the Complaint or Answer stage end quickly (often within 90 days) and with few docket entries (often fewer than 12). While there is heterogeneity in adjudication rates across case types, the pattern of non‐adjudication is widespread, and aggregate results are not driven by outliers. We find considerable heterogeneity in the level of non‐adjudication among individual judges, underscoring the importance of judicial discretion to case processing. Further study of the consequences of the lack of dispositive motion practice in most federal cases for the functioning of the legal system and for the larger society is warranted.

Suggested Citation

  • Charlotte S. Alexander & Nathan Dahlberg & Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, 2025. "No Adjudication," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(4), pages 544-567, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:22:y:2025:i:4:p:544-567
    DOI: 10.1111/jels.70007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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