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CEO Compensation and Stakeholders' Claims

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  • ALKA ARORA
  • PERVAIZ ALAM

Abstract

The traditional view that a corporation exists solely to serve the interests of the firm's shareholders has given way to a changing view that recognizes the importance of corporate constituents in addition to shareholders. Prior studies demonstrate a significant association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation and a firm's stock prices. However, the association between CEO compensation and the claim of other primary stakeholders (customers, employees, suppliers) has not been examined. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the adoption of long†term incentive plans aligns the interest of the CEO with the interest of the primary stakeholders in the firm. Using the fixed†effect regression, our results indicate a significant association between the change in CEO compensation and the claims of the customers, shareholders, and employees. We contribute to the literature by demonstrating that the managers are accountable not only to the shareholders but also to primary stakeholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Alka Arora & Pervaiz Alam, 2005. "CEO Compensation and Stakeholders' Claims," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(3), pages 519-547, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:22:y:2005:i:3:p:519-547
    DOI: 10.1506/8DLT-1RHN-WGBB-CHTM
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Mayberry, 2020. "Good for managers, bad for society? Causal evidence on the association between risk‐taking incentives and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(9-10), pages 1182-1214, October.
    2. Bhaskar, Ratikant & Bansal, Shashank & Abbassi, Wajih & Pandey, Dharen Kumar, 2023. "CEO compensation and CSR: Economic implications and policy recommendations," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 232-256.
    3. Karen Maas & Sanne Rosendaal, 2016. "Sustainability Targets in Executive Remuneration: Targets, Time Frame, Country and Sector Specification," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(6), pages 390-401, September.
    4. Ahmed Imran Hunjra & Peter Verhoeven & Qasim Zureigat, 2020. "Capital Structure as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship between Uncertainty, CSR, Stakeholder Interest and Financial Performance," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-18, June.
    5. Camélia Radu & Nadia Smaili, 2022. "Alignment Versus Monitoring: An Examination of the Effect of the CSR Committee and CSR-Linked Executive Compensation on CSR Performance," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 180(1), pages 145-163, September.
    6. Julija Winschel & Martin Stawinoga, 2019. "Determinants and effects of sustainable CEO compensation: a structured literature review of empirical evidence," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 265-328, September.
    7. Wang, Jin, 2012. "Do firms' relationships with principal customers/suppliers affect shareholders' income?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 860-878.

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