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Central Bank Independence – From the European Union Law to the Czech Republic Example

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  • Kohajda Michael

    (Assoc. prof. JUDr. Michael Kohajda, Ph.D., Department of Administrative Law and Financial Law, Faculty of Law, Palacký University Olomouc, .)

Abstract

This article defines the basic kinds of central bank independence as generally accepted by the professional community. Then, for each of the kinds, their content and their fulfilment in the law of the Czech Republic are discussed. Of course, the legal regulation of the Czech National Bank as a central bank of a Member State of the European Union must meet the basic requirements of E.U. law for the independent status of central banks. However, the degree and manner of fulfilling these requirements beyond the basis of E.U. law vary from one Member State to another. The Czech National Bank is endowed with a high degree of independence, partly because of its establishment in the late 1990s. Despite this, some questions relating to its independence remain unanswered. This paper may thus also serve as a source of information for other authors to compare the regulation of the independent status of the central bank of their countries in comparison with the Czech National Bank.

Suggested Citation

  • Kohajda Michael, 2022. "Central Bank Independence – From the European Union Law to the Czech Republic Example," European Studies - The Review of European Law, Economics and Politics, Sciendo, vol. 9(1), pages 234-244, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:eurstu:v:9:y:2022:i:1:p:234-244:n:7
    DOI: 10.2478/eustu-2022-0011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wood,John H., 2005. "A History of Central Banking in Great Britain and the United States," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521850131.
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