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Competition and the Core

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  • Telser, Lester G

Abstract

Core theory is a powerful tool to find competitive market-clearing prices. A familiar economic setting shows this, beginning with a single commodity produced using many factors of production and ending with the general case of many outputs and inputs. The analysis describes when the market has a core. When it has no core, there is a least upper bound on the payment each firm that does not participate in a central market must make that serves as an inducement to restore the core. Each firm can avoid this penalty by trading in the central market, resulting in market-clearing prices. Copyright 1996 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Telser, Lester G, 1996. "Competition and the Core," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 85-107, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:104:y:1996:i:1:p:85-107
    DOI: 10.1086/262018
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    4. Sjostrom, William, 1989. "Collusion in Ocean Shipping: A Test of Monopoly and Empty Core Model s," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1160-1179, October.
    5. Vernon L. Smith, 1994. "Economics in the Laboratory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 113-131, Winter.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Jeroen van den Bergh & John Gowdy, 2000. "Evolutionary Theories in Environmental and Resource Economics: Approaches and Applications," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 17(1), pages 37-57, September.
    3. Lindsay, Luke, 2018. "Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 170-181.
    4. Gowdy, John, 1997. "Introduction: biology and economics," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 377-383, October.
    5. Ying Kou & Meifeng Luo, 2016. "Strategic capacity competition and overcapacity in shipping," Maritime Policy & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(4), pages 389-406, May.
    6. Kenneth Button & Peter Nijkamp, 1997. "Network Industries, Economic Stability and Spatial Integration," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-047/3, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Zhang, Yahua & Zhang, Anming, 2021. "COVID-19 and bailout policy: The case of Virgin Australia," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 174-181.
    8. Czerny, Achim I. & Mitusch, Kay, 2005. "Cooperation and competition in the cargo liner shipping industry," Discussion Papers 2005/3, Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Iwan Bos & Erik Pot, 2012. "On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 107(3), pages 199-216, November.
    10. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.

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