Government Oversight of Public Universities: Are Centralized Performance Schemes Related to Increased Quantity or Quality?
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- Marta De Philippis, 2015.
"Multitask Agents and Incentives: The Case of Teaching and Research for University Professors,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp1386, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Philippis, Marta De, 2015. "Multitask agents and incentives: the case of teachingand research for university professors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65007, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Marta De Philippis, 2015. "Multitask agents and incetives: the case of teaching and research for university professors," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1042, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
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