Income Distribution, Police Expenditures, and Crime: A Political Economy Perspective
In this paper, I present a structural approach to investigate empirically the relation between income distribution, police expenditures and crime. The approach is based on the estimation of an equilibrium model where heterogeneous individuals choose whether to engage in criminal activities and expenditures on police to apprehend criminals are determined endogenously through majority voting. I discuss the identification and estimation of the parameters of the structural model using data for the United States. (JEL: D72, D78, K42) Copyright (c) 2003 The European Economic Association.
Volume (Year): 1 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (04/05)
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