The British Passenger Rail Privatisation: Conclusions on Subsidy and Efficiency from the First Round of Franchises
The paper examines the issue of subsidy cuts and efficiency gains arising from the first round of franchises from the British passenger rail privatisation. A problem is identified in past studies regarding the lack of a progressive dynamic between subsidy and efficiency over time. This paper assesses efficiency changes and productivity gains achieved by the British train-operating companies over an 8-year period, and then attempts to establish a statistical relationship between efficiency gains and subsidy cuts. Although such a relationship is established, the results more broadly indicate winner's curse syndrome and the strong negotiating position of the incumbent. © 2009 LSE and the University of Bath
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 43 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.bath.ac.uk/e-journals/jtep|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpe:jtecpo:v:43:y:2009:i:1:p:85-104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.