Contract negotiation and risk preferences in dual-channel supply chain coordination

This study employs profit-sharing contracts to coordinate dual-channel supply chains and examines the selection of profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit gained from coordination. We characterise the Pareto-optimal contracts for the two- and three-stage dual-channel supply chains, by developing and maximising system utility function related to risk preferences and negotiating power. Under the optimal profit-sharing parameter in a two-stage supply chain, both members are reluctant to cooperate; however, in a three-stage supply chain, under the optimal two profit-sharing parameters selected by optimising the system utility function, the retailer is always reluctant to cooperate, but the distributor or the supplier may have incentives to deviate from cooperation. In this case, the distributor and the supplier will negotiate again as in a two-stage supply chain so that all three members can benefit from coordination with profit-sharing contracts. Besides acting independently, the distributor, in the process of contract negotiation, may choose to form an alliance with the upstream supplier or the downstream retailer, which means the relationship among the three members involving profit allocation after coordination is quite different from that for a two-stage supply chain and is not necessarily interest-contrary. In the contract negotiation, in any kind of scenario, risk aversion and negotiation power have a significant impact on the selection of optimal profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit. One member’s risk aversion or its negotiation power may be advantageous to the other. Mathematical examples are illustrated to clarify the contract negotiation process.