Neocapture: regulatory competition in an open market world
This paper shows that inter-regulatory competition can have powerful pro-consumer effects in an open economy world even when the consumers have little political influence. These findings overturn the welfare implications of capture theories that show that regulators do not vigorously pursue public interests. The paper also points to the kinds of markets where the political competition has more or less powerful effects (fixed cost technology case). Since markets have become more integrated over time, there are obvious implications for the evolution of regulation.
Volume (Year): 22 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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