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Optimal subsidies and guarantees in public--private partnerships

Author

Listed:
  • Manuel J. Rocha Armada
  • Paulo J. Pereira
  • Artur Rodrigues

Abstract

In this paper, we analyse how certain subsidies and guarantees given to private firms in public--private partnerships should be optimally arranged to promote immediate investment in a real options framework. We show how an investment subsidy, a revenue subsidy, a minimum demand guarantee, and a rescue option could be optimally arranged to induce immediate investment, compensating for the value of the option to defer. These four types of incentives produce significantly different results when we compare the value of the project after the incentive structure is devised and also when we compare the timing of the resulting cash flows.

Suggested Citation

  • Manuel J. Rocha Armada & Paulo J. Pereira & Artur Rodrigues, 2012. "Optimal subsidies and guarantees in public--private partnerships," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(5), pages 469-495, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:eurjfi:v:18:y:2012:i:5:p:469-495
    DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2011.639789
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. João Adelino Ribeiro & Paulo Jorge Pereira & Elísio Brandão, 2013. "A Two-Factor Uncertainty Model to Determine the Optimal Contractual Penalty for a Build-Own-Transfer Project," CEF.UP Working Papers 1308, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    2. Zihan Liu & Ju’e Guo & Shubin Wang & Hongtao Liu, 2018. "Government incentive strategies and private capital participation in China’s Shale gas development," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(1), pages 51-64, January.
    3. Vitor Carvalho & Diogo Barbosa & Paulo Jorge Pereira, 2013. "The interaction between firms and Government in the context of investment decisions: a real options approach," EcoMod2013 5390, EcoMod.
    4. Silaghi, Florina & Sarkar, Sudipto, 2021. "Agency problems in public-private partnerships investment projects," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 290(3), pages 1174-1191.
    5. Lukas, Elmar & Thiergart, Sascha, 2019. "The interaction of debt financing, cash grants and the optimal investment policy under uncertainty," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 276(1), pages 284-299.
    6. Barbosa, Diogo & Carvalho, Vitor M. & Pereira, Paulo J., 2016. "Public stimulus for private investment: An extended real options model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PB), pages 742-748.
    7. Adkins, Roger & Paxson, Dean & Pereira, Paulo J. & Rodrigues, Artur, 2019. "Investment decisions with finite-lived collars," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 185-204.
    8. Nagy, Roel L.G. & Fleten, Stein-Erik & Sendstad, Lars H., 2023. "Don’t stop me now: Incremental capacity growth under subsidy termination risk," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    9. Lukas, Elmar & Spengler, Thomas Stefan & Kupfer, Stefan & Kieckhäfer, Karsten, 2017. "When and how much to invest? Investment and capacity choice under product life cycle uncertainty," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 260(3), pages 1105-1114.

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