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A cost benefit study of voluntary disclosure: some empirical evidence from French listed companies

  • Florence Depoers
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    The aim of this paper is to relate the extent of disclosure in the annual reports of French listed companies to some economic determinants. The sample includes the 1995 annual reports of 102 randomly selected industrial and commercial firms. The extent of disclosure is measured by an index based on financial and non-financial discretionary information. The model of hypothesis explaining voluntary disclosure is defined as the interplay of contradictory forces: inducements deriving principally from agency theory and limitations imposed by information costs. The results reveal that voluntary disclosure is significantly related to size, foreign activity and to a proxy for proprietary costs.

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    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09638180050129891
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    Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal European Accounting Review.

    Volume (Year): 9 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 245-263

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    Handle: RePEc:taf:euract:v:9:y:2000:i:2:p:245-263
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    1. Verrecchia, Robert E., 1990. "Information quality and discretionary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 365-380, March.
    2. Bernard Raffournier, 1995. "The determinants of voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss listed companies," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(2), pages 261-280.
    3. Darrough, Masako N. & Stoughton, Neal M., 1990. "Financial disclosure policy in an entry game," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1-3), pages 219-243, January.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
    6. Pascal Frantz, 1997. "Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: A Game-Theoretical Perspective," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(9&10), pages 1421-1431.
    7. Verrecchia, Robert E., 1983. "Discretionary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 179-194, April.
    8. Wagenhofer, Alfred, 1990. "Voluntary disclosure with a strategic opponent," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 341-363, March.
    9. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Warner, Jerold B., 1979. "On financial contracting : An analysis of bond covenants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 117-161, June.
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