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Beyond Asymmetry: Substantive Beliefs in Preference Formation and Efficiency of Asymmetrical Negotiations

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  • Elijah Nyaga Munyi

Abstract

Contrary to extant propositions on the primacy of trade dependency in compelling faster agreement by subordinate states in asymmetrical economic negotiations, in the European Union-Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (EU-ACP) Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, it is the states that were least materially vulnerable that were quickest to accept an EPA. Why so? I argue that the speed and propensity of ACP states to accept and ratify their EPAs were principally hinged on variances in preference formation based on what Ikenberry and Kupchan [(1990), 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', International Organization , 44 (3), pp. 283-315: 283] call 'substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs'. The quickest states to ratify an EPA were those which most intensely shared the EU's neoliberal belief in an automatic correlation between trade liberalisation and economic growth, rather than those that were most materially vulnerable. Therefore, by taking the normative sources of preference formation by subordinate states seriously, we can not only derive a parsimonious explanation of EPA negotiating efficiency but also form a foundational conceptual model of predicting efficiency in asymmetrical negotiations that unifies the role of both normative and material considerations.

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  • Elijah Nyaga Munyi, 2016. "Beyond Asymmetry: Substantive Beliefs in Preference Formation and Efficiency of Asymmetrical Negotiations," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(1), pages 49-68, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:cnpexx:v:21:y:2016:i:1:p:49-68
    DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2015.1041481
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lempereur, Alain Pekar, 2009. "Leading Successful Negotiations on Behalf of Europe: An Analysis of the European Commission High-Ranking Officials’ Practices," European Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(3-4), pages 541-568, October.
    2. Ikenberry, G. John & Kupchan, Charles A., 1990. "Socialization and hegemonic power," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 283-315, July.
    3. Moravcsik, Andrew, 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 513-553, October.
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    1. Samuel Brazys & Martijn Schoonvelde, 2022. "Home Field Advantage? EU–ACP Economic Partnership Agreement Meeting Locations and Textual Tone," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 903-925, July.

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