IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/topjnl/v20y2012i1p28-29.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Comments on: Algorithms for linear programming with linear complementarity constraints

Author

Listed:
  • S. Dempe

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • S. Dempe, 2012. "Comments on: Algorithms for linear programming with linear complementarity constraints," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 20(1), pages 28-29, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:20:y:2012:i:1:p:28-29 DOI: 10.1007/s11750-011-0231-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11750-011-0231-7
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Housman & (*), Lori Clark, 1998. "Note Core and monotonic allocation methods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 611-616.
    2. J. Arin, 2013. "Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young’s theorem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 325-337, May.
    3. S. C. Littlechild & G. Owen, 1973. "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 370-372.
    4. Calleja, Pedro & Rafels, Carles & Tijs, Stef, 2009. "The aggregate-monotonic core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 742-748, July.
    5. Julio González-Díaz & Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez, 2007. "A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(1), pages 27-46, September.
    6. William Thomson, 2007. "Cost allocation and airport problems," RCER Working Papers 537, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hélène Le Cadre, 2018. "On the Efficiency of Local Electricity Markets Under Decentralized and Centralized Designs: A Multi-leader Stackelberg Game Analysis," Working Papers hal-01619885, HAL.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:20:y:2012:i:1:p:28-29. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.