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Balancing law and politics: Judicial incentives in WTO dispute settlement

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  • Ryan Brutger
  • Julia Morse

Abstract

Can international courts ever be independent of state influence? If not, how do courts manage the tension between legal principles and political concerns? We address these questions through an analysis of one of the most independent international adjudication mechanisms – dispute settlement at the World Trade Organization (WTO). We find that the ad hoc nature of WTO panels, judicial hierarchy, and panelists’ concern for compliance create a set of incentives that encourage panelists to moderate rulings against the most powerful WTO members. Our analysis shows that WTO dispute settlement panels limit the negative effects of judgements against the United States and the European Union by reducing the scope of such verdicts through the use of judicial economy. We argue that WTO panels use this practice to balance the demands of the law with the concerns of powerful members, which results in a level of judicial restraint on the part of panels and increased prospects for compliance by the US and EU. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Ryan Brutger & Julia Morse, 2015. "Balancing law and politics: Judicial incentives in WTO dispute settlement," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 179-205, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:10:y:2015:i:2:p:179-205
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-015-9216-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ryan Brutger & Richard Clark, 2023. "At what cost? Power, payments, and public support of international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-465, July.
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    3. Christina Davis, 2015. "The political logic of dispute settlement: Introduction to the special issue," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 107-117, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International institutions; WTO; International law; Judicial bias; Power; Dispute settlement; F5;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy

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