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The State in Court: the economic effects of fee-shifting rules in Spain when suing the government

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  • Fernando Gómez
  • Anna Ginès-Fabrellas
  • Ignacio Marín-García

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Fernando Gómez & Anna Ginès-Fabrellas & Ignacio Marín-García, 2009. "The State in Court: the economic effects of fee-shifting rules in Spain when suing the government," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 8(3), pages 183-203, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:portec:v:8:y:2009:i:3:p:183-203
    DOI: 10.1007/s10258-009-0045-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:reg:rpubli:156 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    3. Francisco Cabrillo & Sean Fitzpatrick, 2008. "The Economics of Courts and Litigation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3421.
    4. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-1097, September.
    5. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    6. Kessler, Daniel P. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2007. "Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 343-402, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    State as defendant; Procedural privileges; Legal fees; Fee-shifting rules; Litigation; Settlement; “Loser-pays-all”; “Each-pays-his-own”; K41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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