Technological standards with local externalities and decentralized behaviour
We model a situation in which agents must choose between two technologies that operate under local, positive network externalities. We find that decentralized behaviour can lead to the emergence of a technical standard, but can also result in a variety of other equilibria. Policy to eliminate non-standardized equilibria can be effected, but in some cases it may be very costly.
Volume (Year): 8 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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