Decentralization of Pareto optima in economies with public projects, nonessential private goods and convex costs (☆)
In the theory of economies with public goods one usually considers the case in which private goods are essential, i.e., each agent receives a fixed minimum level of utility if he consumes no private goods, irrespective of the public goods consumed. This paper develops the second welfare theorem for economies with public projects and possibly inessential private goods. As a corollary we also derive conditions under which valuation equilibria exist.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 8 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received:June 15, 1994; revised version September 15, 1995|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm |
|Order Information:||Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:8:y:1996:i:3:p:555-564. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.