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Improved algorithmic results for unsplittable stable allocation problems

Author

Listed:
  • Ágnes Cseh

    (TU Berlin)

  • Brian C. Dean

    (Clemson University)

Abstract

The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is “stable” based on a set of underlying preference lists submitted by the jobs and machines. Building on the initial work of Dean et al. (The unsplittable stable marriage problem, 2006), we study a natural “unsplittable” variant of this problem, where each assigned job must be fully assigned to a single machine. Such unsplittable bipartite assignment problems generally tend to be NP-hard, including previously-proposed variants of the unsplittable stable allocation problem (McDermid and Manlove in J Comb Optim 19(3): 279–303, 2010). Our main result is to show that under an alternative model of stability, the unsplittable stable allocation problem becomes solvable in polynomial time; although this model is less likely to admit feasible solutions than the model proposed in McDermid and Manlove (J Comb Optim 19(3): 279–303, McDermid and Manlove 2010), we show that in the event there is no feasible solution, our approach computes a solution of minimal total congestion (overfilling of all machines collectively beyond their capacities). We also describe a technique for rounding the solution of a stable allocation problem to produce “relaxed” unsplit solutions that are only mildly infeasible, where each machine is overcongested by at most a single job.

Suggested Citation

  • Ágnes Cseh & Brian C. Dean, 2016. "Improved algorithmic results for unsplittable stable allocation problems," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 657-671, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jcomop:v:32:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s10878-015-9889-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10878-015-9889-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
    2. Eric J. McDermid & David F. Manlove, 2010. "Keeping partners together: algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 279-303, April.
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    5. DINITZ, Yefim & GARG, Naveen & GOEMANS, Michel X., 1999. "On the single-source unsplittable flow problem," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1433, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Péter Biró & Flip Klijn, 2013. "Matching With Couples: A Multidisciplinary Survey," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1-18.
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