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A space-time network for telecommuting versus commuting decision-making

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  • Anna Nagurney

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  • June Dong
  • Patricia Mokhtarian

Abstract

In this article, we develop a theoretical framework for the study of telecommuting versus commuting decision-making over a fixed time horizon, such as a work week through the use of a space-time network to conceptualize the decision-makers’ choices over space and time. The decision-makers are multiclass and multicriteria ones and perceive the criteria of travel cost, travel time, and opportunity cost in an individual fashion. The model is a network equilibrium type and allows for the prediction of the equilibrium flows and, hence, the number of periods that members of each class of decision-makers will telecommute or commute. Qualitative properties of the equilibrium are obtained and an algorithm is given, along with convergence results, and applied to numerical examples. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Nagurney & June Dong & Patricia Mokhtarian, 2003. "A space-time network for telecommuting versus commuting decision-making," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 82(4), pages 451-473, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:82:y:2003:i:4:p:451-473 DOI: 10.1007/s10110-003-0119-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Peng & Liao, Feixiong & Huang, Hai-Jun & Timmermans, Harry, 2015. "Dynamic activity-travel assignment in multi-state supernetworks," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 81(P3), pages 656-671.

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