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Articulating bargaining theories: movement, chance, and necessity as descriptive principles

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  • Sigifredo Laengle

    (University of Chile)

Abstract

The Nash Demand Game (NDG) has been one of the first models (Nash in Econometrica 21(1):128–140, 1953. https://doi.org/10.2307/1906951 ) that has tried to describe the process of negotiation, competition, and cooperation. This model has had enormous repercussions and has leveraged basic and applied research on bargaining processes. Therefore, we wonder whether it is possible to articulate extensive and multiple developments into a single unifying framework. The Viability Theory has this inclusive approach. Thus, we investigate the NDG under this point of view, and, carrying out this work, we find that the answer is not only affirmative but that we also advance in characterising viable NDGs. In particular, we found foundations describe the distributive Bargaining Theory: the principle of movement and the principle of chance and necessity. Finally, this initial work has many interesting perspectives. The probably most important idea is to integrate developments of the Bargaining Theory and thus capture the complexity of the real world in an articulated way.

Suggested Citation

  • Sigifredo Laengle, 2021. "Articulating bargaining theories: movement, chance, and necessity as descriptive principles," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 29(1), pages 49-71, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:29:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s10100-020-00729-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10100-020-00729-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    3. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
    4. Sigifredo Laengle & Gino Loyola, 2014. "Learning in Highly Polarized Conflicts," Operations Research Proceedings, in: Dennis Huisman & Ilse Louwerse & Albert P.M. Wagelmans (ed.), Operations Research Proceedings 2013, edition 127, pages 271-278, Springer.
    5. Sigifredo Laengle & Gino Loyola & David Tobón-Orozco, 2020. "Bargaining under polarization: The case of the Colombian armed conflict," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(4), pages 551-563, July.
    6. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
    7. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Stummer & Ayşegül Engin, 2021. "A tribute to Rudolf Vetschera," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 29(1), pages 1-6, March.

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