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The traveling salesman game: An application ofcost allocation in a gas and oil company

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  • Stefan Engevall
  • Maud Göthe-Lundgren
  • Peter Värbrand

Abstract

In this article, a cost allocation problem that arises in a distribution planning situation atthe Logistics Department at Norsk Hydro Olje AB is studied. A specific tour is considered,for which the total distribution cost is to be divided among the customers that are visited.This problem is formulated as a traveling salesman game, and cost allocation methods basedon different concepts from cooperative game theory, such as the nucleolus, the Shapleyvalue and the t-value, are discussed. Additionally, a new concept is introduced: the demandnucleolus. Computational results for the Norsk Hydro case are presented and discussed. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Engevall & Maud Göthe-Lundgren & Peter Värbrand, 1998. "The traveling salesman game: An application ofcost allocation in a gas and oil company," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 82(0), pages 203-218, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:82:y:1998:i:0:p:203-218:10.1023/a:1018935324969
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1018935324969
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    Cited by:

    1. Elena Iñarra & Roberto Serrano & Ken-Ichi Shimomura, 2020. "The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 71(2), pages 225-266.
    2. Ralf Borndörfer & Nam-Dũng Hoang, 2015. "Fair ticket pricing in public transport as a constrained cost allocation game," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 226(1), pages 51-68, March.
    3. Stefan Engevall & Maud Göthe-Lundgren & Peter Värbrand, 2004. "The Heterogeneous Vehicle-Routing Game," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(1), pages 71-85, February.
    4. Yang, Fei & Dai, Ying & Ma, Zu-Jun, 2020. "A cooperative rich vehicle routing problem in the last-mile logistics industry in rural areas," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    5. Kellner, Florian & Schneiderbauer, Miriam, 2019. "Further insights into the allocation of greenhouse gas emissions to shipments in road freight transportation: The pollution routing game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 278(1), pages 296-313.
    6. Trine Platz & Herbert Hamers, 2015. "On games arising from multi-depot Chinese postman problems," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 235(1), pages 675-692, December.
    7. Okan Örsan Özener & Özlem Ergun & Martin Savelsbergh, 2013. "Allocating Cost of Service to Customers in Inventory Routing," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(1), pages 112-125, February.
    8. Olivier Massol & Stéphane Tchung-Ming, 2009. "Stratégies coopératives dans l'industrie du GNL : l'argument de la rationalisation est-il fondé ?," Working Papers hal-02469480, HAL.
    9. Mathijs van Zon & Remy Spliet & Wilco van den Heuvel, 2021. "The Joint Network Vehicle Routing Game," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(1), pages 179-195, 1-2.
    10. Mathijs van Zon & Remy Spliet & Wilco van den Heuvel, 2021. "The Joint Network Vehicle Routing Game," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(1), pages 179-195, 1-2.
    11. Youngsub Chun & Nari Park & Duygu Yengin, 2016. "Coincidence of cooperative game theoretic solutions in the appointment problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(3), pages 699-708, August.

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