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In Defense of Game Theory

Author

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  • JOHN C. HARSANYI

    (University of California, Berkeley)

Abstract

In this article, the author analyzes and argues against the claims made by Michael Hechter, Gordon Tullock, and Aaron Wildavsky that game theory has limited value for the social sciences.

Suggested Citation

  • John C. Harsanyi, 1992. "In Defense of Game Theory," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 51-61, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:51-61
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463192004001007
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
    3. Aaron Wildavsky, 1992. "Indispensable Framework or Just another Ideology?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 8-23, January.
    4. Gordon Tullock, 1992. "Games and Preference," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 24-32, January.
    5. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
    6. Michael Hechter, 1992. "The Insufficiency of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 4(1), pages 33-40, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Holler Manfred J., 2002. "Classical, Modern, and New Game Theory / Klassische, Moderne und Neue Spieltheorie," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 222(5), pages 556-583, October.
    2. Peter Abell, 1996. "A Model Of The Informal Structure (Culture) Of Organizations," Rationality and Society, , vol. 8(4), pages 433-452, November.

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