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A Truth Serum for Eliciting Self-Evaluations in Scientific Reviews

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Listed:
  • Jibang Wu
  • Haifeng Xu
  • Yifan Guo
  • Weijie Su

Abstract

This paper designs a simple, efficient and truthful mechanism to to elicit self-evaluations about items jointly owned by owners. A key application of this mechanism is to improve the peer review of large scientific conferences where a paper often has multiple authors and many authors have multiple papers. Our mechanism is designed to generate an entirely new source of review data truthfully elicited from paper owners, and can be used to augment the traditional approach of eliciting review data only from peer reviewers. Our approach starts by partitioning all submissions of a conference into disjoint blocks, each of which shares a common set of co-authors. We then elicit the ranking of the submissions from each author and employ isotonic regression to produce adjusted review scores that align with both the reported ranking and the raw review scores. Under certain conditions, truth-telling by all authors is a Nash equilibrium for any valid partition of the overlapping ownership sets. We prove that to ensure truthfulness for such isotonic regression based mechanisms, partitioning the authors into blocks and eliciting only ranking information independently from each block is necessary. This leave the optimization of block partition as the only room for maximizing the estimation efficiency of our mechanism, which is a computationally intractable optimization problem in general. Fortunately, we develop a nearly linear-time greedy algorithm that provably finds a performant partition with appealing robust approximation guarantees. Extensive experiments on both synthetic data and real-world conference review data demonstrate the effectiveness of this owner-assisted calibration mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Jibang Wu & Haifeng Xu & Yifan Guo & Weijie Su, 2023. "A Truth Serum for Eliciting Self-Evaluations in Scientific Reviews," Papers 2306.11154, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2306.11154
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Weijie J. Su, 2022. "A Truthful Owner-Assisted Scoring Mechanism," Papers 2206.08149, arXiv.org.
    3. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
    4. Elise S. Brezis & Aliaksandr Birukou, 2020. "Arbitrariness in the peer review process," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 123(1), pages 393-411, April.
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