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Pre-election polling and sequential elections

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  • Patrick Hummel

    (Yahoo! Research, Berkeley, USA, phummel@yahoo-inc.com)

Abstract

I consider a model in which the winner of a primary election faces a third candidate in a general election immediately thereafter. Prior to the primary election, there is a pre-election poll on how voters would vote in a hypothetical general election between one of the candidates in the primary election and the third candidate. I illustrate that voters have an incentive to misrepresent their voting intentions in the pre-election poll in order to influence voter beliefs about candidate electability in the general election and possibly cause voters to vote differently in the primary election.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Hummel, 2011. "Pre-election polling and sequential elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(4), pages 463-479, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:23:y:2011:i:4:p:463-479
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629811416322
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    References listed on IDEAS

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