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Boys and Their Toys: Status Inconsistency in Non-democratic Regimes and the Import of Major Weapon Systems

Author

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  • Richard A.I. Johnson
  • Aaron P. Shreve

Abstract

Major weapon system imports are significant as they are useful for domestic and international security. However, states regularly imported weapons they want in addition to weapons they need. One explanation is that states import unnecessary weapons to gain status. We argue that states suffering from higher levels of negative status inconsistency (SI) import a greater proportion of status symbol weapons. To account for differing security motives, we also separate non-democratic regime types – strongman, junta, boss, and machine – as they vary in their international conflict propensity and domestic stability. Due to the differences across these regimes, we further argue that non-democratic personalist regimes will import more status symbol weapons. Using data covering 1965–1999, we find that negatively status inconsistent regimes import more status symbol weapons.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard A.I. Johnson & Aaron P. Shreve, 2024. "Boys and Their Toys: Status Inconsistency in Non-democratic Regimes and the Import of Major Weapon Systems," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 68(10), pages 2101-2127, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:68:y:2024:i:10:p:2101-2127
    DOI: 10.1177/00220027231220021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven Ward, 2020. "Status from fighting? Reassessing the relationship between conflict involvement and diplomatic rank," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(2), pages 274-290, March.
    2. Brian Lai & Dan Slater, 2006. "Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950–1992," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(1), pages 113-126, January.
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