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Transforming a Nation-Dominant International System

Author

Listed:
  • Dina A. Zinnes

    (Indiana University)

  • John V. Gillespie

    (Indiana University)

  • G. S. Tahim

    (Indiana University)

Abstract

This paper investigates the problem of system transformation. Focusing on one attribute of system structure, the distribution of power, it is shown that certain power distributions are incompatible with certain optimizing behaviors. Specifically, it is shown that if a system contains a dominant nation, a nation whose power exceeds the sum of the power of all remaining nations, and if nations optimize using stochastic inputs, then the dominant nation will lose its superiority. It is further shown, through a generalization of the argument, that the application of stochastic inputs also insures against subsystem dominance, thus providing a guarantee against “spheres of influence†by some nations over subsets of nations. The general argument is substantiated by showing that similar results can be obtained by way of two different forms of analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Dina A. Zinnes & John V. Gillespie & G. S. Tahim, 1978. "Transforming a Nation-Dominant International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 22(4), pages 547-564, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:22:y:1978:i:4:p:547-564
    DOI: 10.1177/002200277802200401
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gillespie, John V. & Zinnes, Dina A. & Tahim, G.S. & Schrodt, Philip A. & Rubison, R. Michael, 1977. "An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 226-244, March.
    2. M. Simaan & J. B. Cruz, Jr., 1975. "Nash Equilibrium Strategies for the Problem of Armament Race and Control," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(1), pages 96-105, September.
    3. Brito, D L, 1972. "A Dynamic Model of an Armaments Race," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(2), pages 359-375, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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