IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/fortra/v58y2023i1p68-99.html

Public Infrastructure Strategically Supplied by Governments and Trade in a Ricardian Economy

Author

Listed:
  • Nobuhito Suga
  • Makoto Tawada
  • Akihiko Yanase

Abstract

In a simple two-country Ricardian economy with public infrastructures, we consider a simultaneous and non-cooperate game between governments with respect to public infrastructure supply. Then it is shown that a country with larger (smaller) factor endowment exports a good whose production is more (less) dependent on public infrastructures, and both countries will gain from trade as long as factor endowment differs between countries. However, the following special features appear. (i) Any incompletely specialising country produces two goods at an inner point of the production possibility set. (ii) If factor endowment is the same between countries, the trading equilibrium is attained by the pattern of specialisation such that each country specialises in one good different from each other and both countries become better off. Which country specialises in which good is indeterminate. The result shows a typical case of symmetric breaking. JEL codes: F11, H41

Suggested Citation

  • Nobuhito Suga & Makoto Tawada & Akihiko Yanase, 2023. "Public Infrastructure Strategically Supplied by Governments and Trade in a Ricardian Economy," Foreign Trade Review, , vol. 58(1), pages 68-99, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:fortra:v:58:y:2023:i:1:p:68-99
    DOI: 10.1177/00157325221119043
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00157325221119043
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/00157325221119043?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Grandmont, J. M. & McFadden, D., 1972. "A technical note on classical gains from trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 109-125, May.
    3. Spiros Bougheas & Panicos Demetriades & Edgar Morgenroth, 2003. "International aspects of public infrastructure investment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(4), pages 884-910, November.
    4. Chatterjee, Arpita, 2017. "Endogenous comparative advantage, gains from trade and symmetry-breaking," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 102-115.
    5. Connolly, Michael, 1970. "Public Goods, Externalities, and International Relations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 279-290, March-Apr.
    6. Nobuhito Suga & Makoto Tawada, 2007. "International Trade with a Public Intermediate Good and the Gains from Trade," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 284-293, May.
    7. Bougheas, Spiros & Demetriades, Panicos O. & Morgenroth, Edgar L. W., 1999. "Infrastructure, transport costs and trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 169-189, February.
    8. Kiminori Matsuyama, 2002. "Explaining Diversity: Symmetry-Breaking in Complementarity Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 241-246, May.
    9. Meng-Fen Yen & Ruohan Wu & Mario Javier Miranda, 2019. "A general equilibrium model of bilateral trade with strategic public investment in commercial infrastructure," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(6), pages 712-731, August.
    10. Yen, Meng-Fen & Miranda, Mario J., "undated". "A General Equilibrium Model of Bilateral Trade with Strategic Public Investment in Commercial Infrastructure," 2019 Annual Meeting, July 21-23, Atlanta, Georgia 291060, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    11. Koji Shimomura, 2007. "Trade Gains and Public Goods," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 948-954, November.
    12. Stephen R. Yeaple & Stephen S. Golub, 2007. "International Productivity Differences, Infrastructure, and Comparative Advantage," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 223-242, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Konrad, Kai A., 2024. "China’s public international investment: A strategic-trade-policy perspective," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Makoto Tawada & Nobuhito Suga & Akihiko Yanase, 2022. "Government, trade and comparative advantage, revisited," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(2), pages 1135-1165, May.
    2. Akihiko Yanase & Makoto Tawada, 2020. "Public infrastructure and trade in a dynamic two‐country model," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 447-465, May.
    3. Akihiko Yanase & Makoto Tawada, 2017. "Public infrastructure for production and international trade in a small open economy: a dynamic analysis," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 51-73, May.
    4. Kobayashi, Teruyoshi & Ogisu, Yoshitaka & Onaga, Tomokatsu, 2023. "Unstable diffusion in social networks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    5. Suga, Nobuhito & Tawada, Makoto & Yanase, Akihiko, 2025. "A sufficient condition for symmetry-breaking under policy-guided comparative advantage," Discussion paper series. A 382, Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University.
    6. Akihiko Yanase & Ngo Van Long & Ngo Van Long, 2020. "Trade Costs and Strategic Investment in Infrastructure in a Dynamic Global Economy with Symmetric Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 8707, CESifo.
    7. Andrea Moro & Peter Norman, 2019. "Endogenous Comparative Advantage," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 121(3), pages 1088-1124, July.
    8. Andrea Bonilla‐Bolaños, 2021. "A step further in the theory of regional integration: A look at the South American integration strategy," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(5), pages 845-873, July.
    9. Derek Kellenberg, 2015. "Infrastructure, Multinational Affiliate Production, and the Pattern of Trade," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(3), pages 475-502, September.
    10. Andrea Bonilla Bolaños, 2017. "Initiative for Infrastructure Integration in South America: Way Toward Regional Convergence," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(2), pages 326-354, April.
    11. Cao, Zhigang & Yang, Xiaoguang, 2018. "Symmetric games revisited," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 9-18.
    12. Lorz, Oliver, 2020. "Investment in trade facilitating infrastructure: A political-economy analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    13. Egger, Hartmut & Falkinger, Josef, 2006. "The role of public infrastructure and subsidies for firm location and international outsourcing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(8), pages 1993-2015, November.
    14. repec:hpe:journl:y:2025:v:253:i:2:p:27-57 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Thia, Jang Ping & Hu, Yumin, 2025. "Transport costs and the locations of upstream-downstream sectors in China and Indonesia," International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).
    16. Yasir Khan & Taimoor Hassan & Cai Shukai & Hana Oubaih & Muhammad Nisar Khan & Jawed Kootwal & Ubaid Ur Rahman Rehimi, 2022. "The nexus between infrastructure development, economic growth, foreign direct investment, and trade: an empirical investigation from China’s regional trade data," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 2(7), pages 1-31, July.
    17. Akihiko Yanase & Makoto Tawada, 2012. "History‐Dependent Paths And Trade Gains In A Small Open Economy With A Public Intermediate Good," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 303-314, February.
    18. Tran-Nam, Binh, 2016. "A critical review of the normative theory of international trade," International Journal of Development and Conflict, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, vol. 6(1), pages 25-46.
    19. Ujjayant Chakravorty & Joy Mazumdar, 2008. "Openness, Lobbying, and Provision of Infrastructure," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(4), pages 1149-1166, April.
    20. Mirza, Tasneem, 2008. "Analyzing the Effects of Trade Facilitation on International Trade Using a Simultaneous Approach," Conference papers 330239, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    21. Adriana Gama & Isabelle Maret & Virginie Masson, 2019. "Endogenous heterogeneity in duopoly with deterministic one-way spillovers," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 103-123, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:fortra:v:58:y:2023:i:1:p:68-99. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.