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Securing guarantees: How nuclear proliferation can strengthen great power commitments

Author

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  • Julianne Phillips

    (Department of Government, 12330University of Texas at Austin)

Abstract

How does expanding the nuclear club alter the structure of the international system? The structure of alignments in the international system clearly shapes nuclear proliferation, as great powers often pressure subordinates into eschewing nuclear pursuit. What remains unclear, however, is how nuclear acquisition by subordinate states can, in turn, affect these alignments. I use a formal model to show that including great powers’ preferences after their allies have acquired nuclear weapons reveals a new mechanism behind proliferation: nuclear possession can allow states to change their patrons’ incentives and draw them closer, even against their wishes, thereby tightening hierarchies.

Suggested Citation

  • Julianne Phillips, 2023. "Securing guarantees: How nuclear proliferation can strengthen great power commitments," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(1), pages 22-41, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:40:y:2023:i:1:p:22-41
    DOI: 10.1177/07388942221099463
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kroenig, Matthew, 2013. "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 141-171, January.
    2. Bas, Muhammet A. & Coe, Andrew J., 2016. "A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 655-685, October.
    3. Sechser, Todd S. & Fuhrmann, Matthew, 2013. "Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 173-195, January.
    4. Powell, Robert, 2015. "Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 589-626, July.
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