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The Individual Taxpayer Utility Function with Tax Optimization and Fiscal Fraud Environment

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  • Pawe³ Pankiewicz

    (PhD student at the Department of Finance, University of Economics in Krakow, he is also a tax specialist at Tele-Fonika Kable Sp. z o.o. S.K.A)

Abstract

In this paper I examine a taxpayer utility function determined by the extended set of variables – i.e. consumption, labor and tax-evasion propensity. This constitutes the main framework for the analysis of taxpayer’s decision making process under assumption that in the economy there exist two main reduction methods: a) access to tax optimization techniques, which may decrease effective tax burden and are fully compliant with binding laws, but generate transactional costs and 2) possibility of fiscal fraud – in particular tax evasion, as the alternative method of reducing tax due, which has no direct transactional costs, but involves tax litigation risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Pawe³ Pankiewicz, 2011. "The Individual Taxpayer Utility Function with Tax Optimization and Fiscal Fraud Environment," "e-Finanse", University of Information Technology and Management, Institute of Financial Research and Analysis, vol. 7(3), pages 52-58, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:rze:efinan:v:7:y:2011:i:3:p:52-58
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2001. "Direct versus Indirect Taxation: The Design of the Tax Structure Revisted," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(3), pages 781-799, August.
    2. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    3. Simula, Laurent & Trannoy, Alain, 2010. "Optimal income tax under the threat of migration by top-income earners," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 163-173, February.
    4. Bayer, Ralph-C & Sutter, Matthias, 2009. "The excess burden of tax evasion--An experimental detection-concealment contest," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(5), pages 527-543, July.
    5. Efraim Sadka, 1976. "On Income Distribution, Incentive Effects and Optimal Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 43(2), pages 261-267.
    6. Ebert, Udo, 1992. "A reexamination of the optimal nonlinear income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 47-73, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    taxation theory; taxpayer utility; tax evasion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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