Limited Duration Employment
This paper analyses a matching model in which labor market participants use temporary employment as a waiting station between searches. Searchers entering the market see all available options. The best match, however, may not be particularly productive. Since all currently available traders are known, immediate search is not worthwhile. Over time, turnover replenishes the stock of potential traders and poor matches eventually find it profitable to search again. Searchers therefore take the best available match and simultaneously formulate if and when to look again. The best matches become indefinite; lower quality matches coexist as temporary employment. This duration increases with match quality and declines as matching improves. (Copyright: Elsevier)
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Volume (Year): 10 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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