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Adverse Selection and Convertible Bonds

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  • Archishman Chakraborty
  • Bilge Yilmaz

Abstract

Informational asymmetries between a firm and investors may lead to adverse selection in capital markets. This paper demonstrates that when the market obtains noisy information about a firm over time, this adverse selection problem can be costlessly solved by issuing callable convertible bonds with restrictive call provisions. Such securities can be designed to make the payoff to new claimholders independent of the private information of the manager. This eliminates the possibility of any dilution of equity or underinvestment and implements the symmetric information outcome in either a pooling or a separating equilibrium. The same first-best efficient outcome can also be implemented by issuing floating-price and mandatory convertibles. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Archishman Chakraborty & Bilge Yilmaz, 2011. "Adverse Selection and Convertible Bonds," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(1), pages 148-175.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:78:y:2011:i:1:p:148-175
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdq002
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Basak, Suleyman & Makarov, Dmitry & Shapiro, Alex & Subrahmanyam, Marti, 2020. "Security design with status concerns," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    2. Stenzel, André, 2018. "Security design with interim public information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 113-130.
    3. Burlacu, Radu & Jimenez-Garcès, Sonia, 2022. "Why do firms issue callable convertible bonds? A critique of the “backdoor equity financing” theory," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    4. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2015. "Signalling to Dispersed Shareholders and Corporate Control," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(3), pages 922-962.
    5. Dutordoir, Marie & Lewis, Craig & Seward, James & Veld, Chris, 2014. "What we do and do not know about convertible bond financing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 3-20.
    6. Martin, Darius & Qiu, Junfeng & Zhang, Yongli, 2015. "Asymmetric information and conversion price reset policy: The case of Chinese convertible debt," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 133-141.
    7. Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2010. "Signaling in Tender Offer Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 7938, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Brendan Daley & Brett Green & Victoria Vanasco, 2016. "Designing securities for scrutiny," Economics Working Papers 1818, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Nov 2021.
    9. Cerezo Sánchez, David, 2017. "An Optimal ICO Mechanism," MPRA Paper 81285, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Koufopoulos, Kostos & Kozhan, Roman & Trigilia, Giulio, 2014. "Optimal Security Design under Asymmetric Information and Profit Manipulation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1050, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    11. Angel Huerga & Carlos Rodríguez-Monroy, 2019. "Mandatory Convertible Notes as a Sustainable Corporate Finance Instrument," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-26, February.
    12. Elettra Agliardi & Rossella Agliardi & Willem Spanjers, 2015. "Convertible Debt: Financing Decisions and Voluntary Conversion under Ambiguity," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 15(4), pages 599-611, December.
    13. Paolo Fulghieri & Diego García & Dirk Hackbarth, 2020. "Asymmetric Information and the Pecking (Dis)Order," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 24(5), pages 961-996.
    14. Qiu, Junfeng & Zhang, Yongli, 2013. "Convertible bonds with resettable conversion prices," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 198-205.
    15. Koufopoulos, Kostas & Kozhan, Roman & Trigilia, Giulio, 2014. "Optimal Security Design under Asymmetric Information and Profit Manipulation," Economic Research Papers 270233, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.

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