IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/oxecpp/v46y1994i3p403-24.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Are Wages Forward Looking?

Author

Listed:
  • Moghadam, Reza
  • Wren-Lewis, Simon

Abstract

This paper presents a study of U.K. earnings over the period 1967-87 aimed at establishing whether wagesetters anticipate future movements in prices. Two models are proposed: the first where agents form rational predictions about future price movements and the second where they use simple rules-of-thumb based on past price movements. These two dynamic models, based on the same long-run equation, are compared, drawing on the methods of D. F. Hendry. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Moghadam, Reza & Wren-Lewis, Simon, 1994. "Are Wages Forward Looking?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 403-424, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:46:y:1994:i:3:p:403-24
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-7653%28199407%292%3A46%3A3%3C403%3AAWFL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R&origin=bc
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gartner, Manfred, 2000. " Political Macroeconomics: A Survey of Recent Developments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 527-561, December.
    2. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    3. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics,in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482 Elsevier.
    4. Anne Sibert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 649-665.
    5. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
    6. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 98-114.
    7. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    8. Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May.
    9. Christopher J. Waller, 2000. "Policy Boards and Policy Smoothing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(1), pages 305-339.
    10. Lockwood, Ben & Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 1998. "Designing Monetary Policy When Unemployment Persists," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(259), pages 327-345, August.
    11. Waller, Christopher J., 1992. "A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 411-428, June.
    12. Forder, James, 1998. "The case for an independent European central bank: A reassessment of evidence and sources," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 53-71, February.
    13. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco, 1998. "The Trade off between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 397-411, July.
    14. Jon Faust, 1992. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," International Finance Discussion Papers 429, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    15. Faust, Jon, 1996. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 267-283, April.
    16. Timberlake, Richard H., 1993. "Monetary Policy in the United States," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226803845.
    17. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    18. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ragnar Nymoen & Gunnar Bardsen & Eilev S. Jansen, 2004. "The empirical relevance of the New Keynesian Phillips curve," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 328, Econometric Society.
    2. Bårdsen, Gunnar & Jansen, Eilev S. & Nymoen, Ragnar, 2003. "Testing the New Keynesian Phillips curve," Memorandum 18/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    3. Darby, Julia & Ireland, Jonathan & Leith, Campbell & Wren-Lewis, Simon, 1998. "COMPACT: a rational expectations, intertemporal model of the United Kingdom economy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-52, January.
    4. Gunnar Bardsen & Eilev Jansen & Ragnar Nymoen, 2002. "Model Specification and Inflation Forecast Uncertainty," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, pages 495-517.
    5. Kees Folmer, 2009. "Why do macro wage elasticities diverge? A meta analysis," CPB Discussion Paper 122, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    6. Harald Uhlig & Martin Lettau, 1999. "Rules of Thumb versus Dynamic Programming," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 148-174, March.
    7. Kees Folmer, 2009. "Why do macro wage elasticities diverge?," CPB Memorandum 224, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:46:y:1994:i:3:p:403-24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/oep .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.