Public Factors and Democracy in Poverty Analysis
If human capital formation necessitates public factors and if the latter are financed by a flat-rate income tax, a neoclassical growth model will produce a growth rate of per capita income and real wages that is proportional to the rate of population growth. If a golden rule tax is not available, taxation in accordance with the preferences of people with higher than average capital income or lower abilities in producing human capital will lead to lower tax rates and median voter democracy to higher tax rates if computed to the golden rule. The level of wages is shown to be lower the lower the tax rate, thus relating tax resistance, democracy and poverty. Copyright 1990 by Royal Economic Society.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 42 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:42:y:1990:i:1:p:268-80. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.