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Contract Enforceability and the Evolution of Social Capital

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  • Ken Jackson

Abstract

Social capital appears to have significant consequences for economic development, yet we know little about how social capital develops or the role of government institutions in promoting or hindering that development. The two key approaches to social capital, as civic engagement or as generalized trust, are combined in a single model focusing on the role of contract enforcement in their development. Contract enforcement is shown to have nonmonotonic effects on civic engagement, generating nonmonotonic effects on the evolution of generalized trust. In particular, moderate levels of contracting institutions may crowd-in civic engagement and trust, whereas high levels of contracting institutions have the opposite effect. Furthermore, the model generates a low-trust trap in which contracting institutions are ineffective at promoting civic engagement or trust. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Ken Jackson, 2013. "Contract Enforceability and the Evolution of Social Capital," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(1), pages 60-77, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:29:y:2013:i:1:p:60-77
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewr016
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    Cited by:

    1. Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Sekkat, Khalid, 2015. "The formal and informal institutional framework of capital accumulation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 754-771.
    2. Muhammad Javed SHEIKH & Ma'rof REDZUAN & Asnarulkhadi Abu SAMAH & Nobaya AHMAD, 2015. "Identifying sources of social capital among the farmers of the rural Sindh province of Pakistan," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 61(4), pages 189-195.
    3. Alessandra Cassar & Giovanna d'Adda & Pauline Grosjean, 2014. "Institutional Quality, Culture, and Norms of Cooperation: Evidence from Behavioral Field Experiments," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(3), pages 821-863.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Paola Giuliano, 2015. "Culture and Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(4), pages 898-944, December.
    5. Christopher Bidner & Ken Jackson, 2011. "Trust and Vulnerability," Discussion Papers 2012-09, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    6. Scott E. Masten & Jens Prüfer, 2014. "On the Evolution of Collective Enforcement Institutions: Communities and Courts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 359-400.
    7. Hernández, José & Guerrero-Luchtenberg, César, 2016. "Social capital, perceptions and economic performance," MPRA Paper 71006, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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