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How and when should companies retain their human capital? Contracts, incentives and human resource implications

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  • Alfonso Gambardella
  • Marco S. Giarratana
  • Claudio Panico

Abstract

The increasing competition in the labor market for human capital pushes firms to create better incentives to manage talented individuals. In this article, we model the optimal employment contract when two features of human capital are present: (i) private information of the employee about his skills; and (ii) the inability to contract on the output of the employment activity. Our model shows how firms can use delegation (i.e., the employee's job autonomy) to provide the incentives to a privately informed employee. The model novelty resides in turning a classic source of potential inefficiency like asymmetric information into a factor that firms can use to design incentives. Our model provides a new explanation of why, in technologically dynamic environments, one observes more intense formations of start-ups and a greater inter-firm mobility of human capital. Our setting also suggests how established companies can use their complementary assets to provide better incentives to their skilled employees. Copyright 2010 The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Associazione ICC. All rights reserved., Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfonso Gambardella & Marco S. Giarratana & Claudio Panico, 2010. "How and when should companies retain their human capital? Contracts, incentives and human resource implications," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 19(1), pages 1-24, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:indcch:v:19:y:2010:i:1:p:1-24
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/icc/dtp039
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    Cited by:

    1. Valentina Tartari & Francesco Di Lorenzo & Benjamin A. Campbell, 2020. "“Another roof, another proof”: the impact of mobility on individual productivity in science," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 276-303, February.
    2. Martin Ruckes & Thomas Rønde, 2015. "Dynamic Incentives in Organizations: Success and Inertia," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(4), pages 475-497, July.
    3. Di Lorenzo, Francesco & Almeida, Paul, 2017. "The role of relative performance in inter-firm mobility of inventors," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1162-1174.
    4. Gambardella, Alfonso & Panico, Claudio, 2014. "On the management of open innovation," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 903-913.
    5. Alfonso Gambardella & Claudio Panico & Giovanni Valentini, 2015. "Strategic incentives to human capital," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 37-52, January.
    6. Sergio G Lazzarini & Luiz F Mesquita & Felipe Monteiro & Aldo Musacchio, 2021. "Leviathan as an inventor: An extended agency model of state-owned versus private firm invention in emerging and developed economies," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 52(4), pages 560-594, June.

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