Durable-Goods Monopoly with Privately Known Impatience: A Theoretical and Experimental Study
We analyze a durable-goods monopoly selling a single unit of a good to a buyer whose value of the good is private information. The discount factors of the buyer and the seller may differ and are also privately known. We derive the closed-form solution of a two-period game and compare it to the behavior observed in experiments. The data are to a large extent consistent with the predictions. (JEL C90, L12, C73) Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
Volume (Year): 42 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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