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Public Ignorance and Estate Tax Repeal: The Effect of Partisan Differences and Survey Incentives

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Listed:
  • Krupnikov, Yanna
  • Levine, Adam Seth
  • Lupia, Arthur
  • Prior, Markus

Abstract

We re–examine whether the broad support for repeal of the estate tax is a result of citizen ignorance. We find that increasing information about the estate tax or politics in general has very different effects on Republicans and Democrats. While high– and low–information Republicans support estate tax repeal, Democratic support is higher among those who know less. However, most highly informed people in both parties support repeal. We also show that standard surveys overestimate the extent of misinformation about the estate tax. Therefore, "ignorance" is not a compelling explanation of why so many people support estate tax repeal.

Suggested Citation

  • Krupnikov, Yanna & Levine, Adam Seth & Lupia, Arthur & Prior, Markus, 2006. "Public Ignorance and Estate Tax Repeal: The Effect of Partisan Differences and Survey Incentives," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 59(3), pages 425-437, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:59:y:2006:i:3:p:425-37
    DOI: 10.17310/ntj.2006.3.02
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    Cited by:

    1. John Lott & Kevin Hassett, 2014. "Is newspaper coverage of economic events politically biased?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 65-108, July.
    2. Arthur Lupia & Adam S. Levine & Jesse O. Menning & Gisela Sin, 2005. "Were Bush Tax Cut Supporters “Simply Ignorant?” A Second Look at Conservatives and Liberals in “Homer Gets a Tax Cut”," Public Economics 0510004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Hope, David & Limberg, Julian & Weber, Nina Sophie, 2021. "Why Do (Some) Ordinary Americans Support Tax Cuts for the Rich? Evidence From a Randomized Survey Experiment," SocArXiv chk9b, Center for Open Science.
    4. Emir Kamenica & Louisa Egan Brad, 2014. "Voters, dictators, and peons: expressive voting and pivotality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 159-176, April.
    5. Karen Rowlingson & Amrita Sood & Trinh Tu, 2021. "Public attitudes to a wealth tax: the importance of ‘capacity to pay’," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(3-4), pages 431-455, September.
    6. repec:osf:socarx:chk9b_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Baber, Hasnan, 2020. "Intentions to participate in political crowdfunding- from the perspective of civic voluntarism model and theory of planned behavior," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    8. Heinemann, Friedrich & Janeba, Eckhard, 2007. "The Globalization of Tax Policy: What German Politicians Believe," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-057, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    9. Brad R. Taylor, 2016. "Exit and the Epistemic Quality of Voice," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 133-144, June.
    10. Ardanaz, Martín & Hübscher, Evelyne & Keefer, Philip & Sattler, Thomas, 2022. "Policy Misperceptions, Information, and the Demand for Redistributive Tax Reform: Experimental Evidence from Latin American Countries," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 12607, Inter-American Development Bank.
    11. Friedrich Heinemann & Eckhard Janeba, 2011. "Viewing Tax Policy Through Party‐Colored Glasses: What German Politicians Believe," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(3), pages 286-311, August.
    12. Brad R. Taylor, 2020. "The psychological foundations of rational ignorance: biased heuristics and decision costs," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 70-88, March.
    13. Marino, Maria & Iacono, Roberto & Mollerstrom, Johanna, 2023. "(Mis-)perceptions, information, and political polarization," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119268, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Chirvi, Malte & Schneider, Cornelius, 2019. "Stated preferences for capital taxation - tax design, misinformation and the role of partisanship," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 242, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    15. Hope, David & Limberg, Julian & Weber, Nina, 2023. "Why do (some) ordinary Americans support tax cuts for the rich? Evidence from a randomised survey experiment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    16. Matthew Kahn, 2007. "Environmental disasters as risk regulation catalysts? The role of Bhopal, Chernobyl, Exxon Valdez, Love Canal, and Three Mile Island in shaping U.S. environmental law," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 17-43, August.
    17. Chirvi, Malte & Schneider, Cornelius, 2020. "Preferences for wealth taxation: Design, framing and the role of partisanship," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 260, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

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