IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/now/jlqjps/100.00010012.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Belief Updating in Sequential Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of a Crisis Bargaining Model

Author

Listed:
  • Tingley, Dustin H.
  • Wang, Stephanie W.

Abstract

We investigate theoretically and experimentally the crisis bargaining model, a dynamic game of two-sided incomplete information with player types drawn from a commonly known distribution. Little work has been done to analyze whether and how players update their beliefs in such games.Within the experiment we elicited beliefs from players about their opponent's type using a proper scoring rule. We implement two treatments that vary the cost of backing down to the first mover after initial entry, generating sharp comparative static predictions in both beliefs and strategies. We find that players do update their beliefs in the predicted directions after observing some of the action choices. However, we highlight evidence of conservative updating relative to rational expectations.

Suggested Citation

  • Tingley, Dustin H. & Wang, Stephanie W., 2010. "Belief Updating in Sequential Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 5(3), pages 243-255, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00010012
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00010012
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00010012
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sam Asher & Lorenzo Casaburi & Plamen Nikolov & Maoliang Ye, 2010. "One step at a time: Does gradualism build coordination?," Framed Field Experiments 00188, The Field Experiments Website.
    2. Kriss, Peter H. & Nagel, Rosemarie & Weber, Roberto A., 2013. "Implicit vs. explicit deception in ultimatum games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 337-346.
    3. repec:gam:jgames:v:10:y:2019:i:4:p:37-:d:271515 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00010012. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alet Heezemans). General contact details of provider: http://www.nowpublishers.com/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.