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Optimal Taxation, Environment Quality, Socially Responsible Firms and Investors

Author

Listed:
  • Renström, Thomas I.
  • Spataro, Luca
  • Marsiliani, Laura

Abstract

We characterize the optimal pollution-, capital- and labour-tax structure in a continuous-time model in the presence of pollution (resulting from production), both in the first- and second-best, allowing investors to be driven by social responsibility objectives. The social responsibility objective takes the form of warm-glow, as in Andreoni (1990) and Dam (2011), inducing firms to reduce pollution through increased abatement activity. Among the results, the second-best pollution tax displays an additivity property and the Chamley–Judd zero capital-income tax can be violated under warm-glow preferences. We also show that first- and second-best pollution taxes are positive, under warm-glow preferences, and, under mild assumptions, the latter yield lower first-best pollution taxes and lower pollution intensity.

Suggested Citation

  • Renström, Thomas I. & Spataro, Luca & Marsiliani, Laura, 2019. "Optimal Taxation, Environment Quality, Socially Responsible Firms and Investors," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 13(3-4), pages 339-373, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jirere:101.00000112
    DOI: 10.1561/101.00000112
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Jiunn & Marsiliani, Laura & Renström, Thomas, 2020. "Optimal sin taxes in the presence of income taxes and health care," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    2. Renström, Thomas I. & Spataro, Luca & Marsiliani, Laura, 2021. "Can subsidies rather than pollution taxes break the trade-off between economic output and environmental protection?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    3. Luca Spataro & Tommaso Crescioli, 2024. "How much capital should be taxed? A review of the quantitative and empirical literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(4), pages 1399-1436, September.
    4. Orlando Gomes, 2020. "Optimal growth under socially responsible investment: a dynamic theoretical model of the trade-off between financial gains and emotional rewards," International Journal of Corporate Social Responsibility, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 1-17, December.
    5. Giorgos N. Diakoulakis & Athanasios Kampas, 2023. "Emission taxes for genuine altruistic firms," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(1), pages 343-359, March.
    6. Duineveld, Sijmen & Hambel, Christoph & Lessmann, Kai, 2025. "Green investors and the return on capital in general equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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