Public Ownership as a Signalling Device
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References listed on IDEAS
- Schmidt, Klaus M, 1996.
"The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach,"
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-24, April.
- Schmidt, Klaus M., 1996. "The costs and benefits of privatization: An incomplete contracts approach," Munich Reprints in Economics 19773, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Swank, Otto H., 1998. "Towards an economic theory of party ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 223-240, May.
- Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1993. "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 27-42, March.
More about this item
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
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