Public Ownership as a Signalling Device
We study public ownership from the perspective of political economics. A partly partisan government runs a state-owned firm. The number of employees the government wants to hire depends both on economic conditions and on the preferences of the government, both unknown to the electorate. The government's policy towards the state-owned firm gives a signal of its preferences, and may thereby influence the probability that the government is re-elected. As a result, the governance of the firm becomes inefficient and static, in the sense that it does not react adequately to changing economic conditions.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:noj:journl:v:27:y:2001:p:3-12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Halvor Mehlum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.