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The coevolution of choosiness and cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • John M. McNamara

    (University of Bristol, University Walk)

  • Zoltan Barta

    (University of Debrecen, Debrecen, H-4010, Hungary)

  • Lutz Fromhage

    (School of Biological Sciences, University of Bristol, Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1UG, UK)

  • Alasdair I. Houston

    (School of Biological Sciences, University of Bristol, Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1UG, UK)

Abstract

Choosy about cooperating If natural selection favours selfish behaviour, how is it that cooperation is so common in many species, including humans? Working with evolutionary simulations, McNamara et al. propose a novel evolutionary mechanism based on a positive coevolutionary feedback between cooperativeness and choosiness. If individuals vary in their degree of cooperativeness, and if they can decide whether or not to continue interacting with each other on the basis of their respective levels of cooperativeness, then cooperation can gradually evolve from an uncooperative state. On this model, individual behavioural differences are the key to the evolution of cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • John M. McNamara & Zoltan Barta & Lutz Fromhage & Alasdair I. Houston, 2008. "The coevolution of choosiness and cooperation," Nature, Nature, vol. 451(7175), pages 189-192, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:nature:v:451:y:2008:i:7175:d:10.1038_nature06455
    DOI: 10.1038/nature06455
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ivan Norscia & Daniela Antonacci & Elisabetta Palagi, 2009. "Mating First, Mating More: Biological Market Fluctuation in a Wild Prosimian," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 4(3), pages 1-6, March.
    2. Christian Hilbe & Moshe Hoffman & Martin A. Nowak, 2015. "Cooperate without Looking in a Non-Repeated Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-15, September.
    3. Paul Rauwolf & Joanna J. Bryson, 2018. "Expectations of Fairness and Trust Co-Evolve in Environments of Partial Information," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 891-917, December.
    4. Jiabin Wu, 2021. "Matching markets and cultural selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(4), pages 267-288, December.
    5. Song, Zhiyuan & Feldman, Marcus W., 2013. "Plant–animal mutualism in biological markets: Evolutionary and ecological dynamics driven by non-heritable phenotypic variance," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 20-30.
    6. Tadeas Priklopil & Krishnendu Chatterjee, 2015. "Evolution of Decisions in Population Games with Sequentially Searching Individuals," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-25, September.
    7. Izquierdo, Luis R. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2014. "Leave and let leave: A sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 91-113.
    8. Christian Hilbe & Kristin Hagel & Manfred Milinski, 2016. "Asymmetric Power Boosts Extortion in an Economic Experiment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(10), pages 1-14, October.
    9. Peña, Jorge & Nöldeke, Georg & Puebla, Oscar, 2018. "The evolution of egg trading in simultaneous hermaphrodites," IAST Working Papers 18-85, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    10. Kohei Miyaji & Jun Tanimoto & Zhen Wang & Aya Hagishima & Naoki Ikegaya, 2013. "Direct Reciprocity in Spatial Populations Enhances R-Reciprocity As Well As ST-Reciprocity," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(8), pages 1-8, August.
    11. Jiabin Wu, 2020. "Labelling, homophily and preference evolution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 1-22, March.
    12. Matjaž Perc & Zhen Wang, 2010. "Heterogeneous Aspirations Promote Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 5(12), pages 1-8, December.
    13. Strømland, Eirik & Tjøtta, Sigve & Torsvik, Gaute, 2016. "Reciprocity evolving: partner choice and communication in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma," Working Papers in Economics 01/16, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    14. Strømland, Eirik & Tjøtta, Sigve & Torsvik, Gaute, 2018. "Mutual choice of partner and communication in a repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 12-23.
    15. Jaakko Junikka & Lucas Molleman & Pieter van den Berg & Franz J Weissing & Mikael Puurtinen, 2017. "Assortment, but not knowledge of assortment, affects cooperation and individual success in human groups," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(10), pages 1-11, October.
    16. Li, Wen-Jing & Chen, Zhi & Jin, Ke-Zhong & Li, Lan & Yuan, Lin & Jiang, Luo-Luo & Perc, Matjaž & Kurths, Jürgen, 2022. "Eliminating poverty through social mobility promotes cooperation in social dilemmas," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    17. Mathias Spichtig & Martijn Egas, 2019. "When and How Does Mutation-Generated Variation Promote the Evolution of Cooperation?," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(1), pages 1-17, January.
    18. Robin Watson & Thomas J. H. Morgan & Rachel L. Kendal & Julie Van de Vyver & Jeremy Kendal, 2021. "Social Learning Strategies and Cooperative Behaviour: Evidence of Payoff Bias, but Not Prestige or Conformity, in a Social Dilemma Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-26, November.

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