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Social image concerns promote cooperation more than altruistic punishment

Author

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  • Gianluca Grimalda

    (Institute for the World Economy
    Universitat Jaume I, Avenida Sos Baynat
    Centre for Global Cooperation Research, University of Duisburg-Essen)

  • Andreas Pondorfer

    (Institute for the World Economy)

  • David P. Tracer

    (University of Colorado Denver)

Abstract

Human cooperation is enigmatic, as organisms are expected, by evolutionary and economic theory, to act principally in their own interests. However, cooperation requires individuals to sacrifice resources for each other’s benefit. We conducted a series of novel experiments in a foraging society where social institutions make the study of social image and punishment particularly salient. Participants played simple cooperation games where they could punish non-cooperators, promote a positive social image or do so in combination with one another. We show that although all these mechanisms raise cooperation above baseline levels, only when social image alone is at stake do average economic gains rise significantly above baseline. Punishment, either alone or combined with social image building, yields lower gains. Individuals’ desire to establish a positive social image thus emerges as a more decisive factor than punishment in promoting human cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Gianluca Grimalda & Andreas Pondorfer & David P. Tracer, 2016. "Social image concerns promote cooperation more than altruistic punishment," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 7(1), pages 1-8, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:natcom:v:7:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1038_ncomms12288
    DOI: 10.1038/ncomms12288
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    Cited by:

    1. Gary Bolton & Eugen Dimant & Ulrich Schmidt, 2018. "When a Nudge Backfires. Using Observation with Social and Economic Incentives to Promote Pro-Social Behavior," PPE Working Papers 0017, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. G. Rejikumar & Aswathy Asokan-Ajitha & Sofi Dinesh & Ajay Jose, 2022. "The role of cognitive complexity and risk aversion in online herd behavior," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 585-621, June.
    3. Quan, Ji & Nie, Jiacheng & Chen, Wenman & Wang, Xianjia, 2022. "Keeping or reversing social norms promote cooperation by enhancing indirect reciprocity," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    4. Blacklow, Paul & Sibly, Hugh & Corman, Amy Beth, 2021. "Do we prefer praise from acquaintances or strangers? An experiment on esteem seeking in one-shot versus repeated interactions," Working Papers 2021-08, University of Tasmania, Tasmanian School of Business and Economics.
    5. Isamu Okada, 2020. "A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-17, July.
    6. Hezhi Chen & Zhijia Zeng & Jianhong Ma, 2020. "The source of punishment matters: Third-party punishment restrains observers from selfish behaviors better than does second-party punishment by shaping norm perceptions," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(3), pages 1-10, March.
    7. Farrow, Katherine & Romaniuc, Rustam, 2019. "The stickiness of norms," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 54-62.
    8. Gary E. Bolton & Eugen Dimant & Ulrich Schmidt, 2020. "When a Nudge Backfires: Combining (Im)Plausible Deniability with Social and Economic Incentives to Promote Behavioral Change," CESifo Working Paper Series 8070, CESifo.

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