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Damages Regimes, Precaution Incentives, and the Intensity Principle

  • Urs Schweizer
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    This paper revisits the accident model at its roots and shows that the intensity principle provides a powerful analytical tool to handle a variety of issues in a unifying frame and based on common intuition. If courts impose inefficient standards, if a cap on liability exists, or if the principal must pay an information rent to induce precaution, the exact method of quantifying damages matters. The intensity principle allows comparing the intensity of precaution incentives under different damages regimes, such as strict liability, proportional liability, and the negligence rule. Moreover, it requires less restrictive assumptions than the more traditional approach.

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    File URL: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mohr/jite/2013/00000169/00000004/art00001
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    Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

    Volume (Year): 169 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 567-586

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    Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201312)169:4_567:drpiat_2.0.tx_2-v
    DOI: 10.1628/093245613X671247
    Contact details of provider: Web page: https://www.mohr.de/jite

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    1. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1998. "A Further Justification for the Negligence Rule," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9801, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
    2. T. Randolph Beard, 1990. "Bankruptcy and Care Choice," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 626-634, Winter.
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